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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission's Order Granting Applicant's
Motion for Review, is without a reasonable basis in the the evidence.

The evidence clearly

indicates that applicant

suffers

fifteen percent (15%) permanent partial disability as a result of
his work-related injuries.

The Industrial Commission's award of

permanent total disability benefits is supportable only by the
most

arbitrary

and

unreasonable

reading

of

the Medical

Panel

Report and therefore it must be set aside.
Allen

v.

Industrial

1986), is applicable

Commission,

729

P.2d

in the present case because

15

(Utah

Respondent's

back injury constitutes precisely the type of internal failure
that Allen addresses.

In any event, Respondent cannot recover

from USX for his disability unless he can show that his industrial accident was the medical cause of the disability.
In interpreting the Medical Panel Report, the Commission introduced an ambiguity, and therefore a question of fact,
that

was

Because
report

not

the
had

present

ambiguity
already

before
was

been

the

Administrative

administratively

admitted

in

Law

created

evidence,

USX

Judge.

after

the

has

been

deprived of its right to cross-examine the witnesses against it
in connection with the newly raised questions of fact.
Finally, the Commission has not complied with Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c)(v) which requires that the
give the reasons for its disposition of the case.
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Commission

ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
MEDICAL'S PANEL REPORT IS WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE BASIS
IN THE EVIDENCE.
Decisions of the Industrial Commission may be set aside

if they are "arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary and
capricious when they are contrary to the evidence or without any
reasonable basis in the evidence."
P. 2d 109, 111 (Utah 1986).

Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732

The Industrial Commission's decision

in this case is based entirely on language which the Commission
interpreted contrary to the entirety of the evidence, thus creating an ambiguity where none had existed before.

The medical

panel found that Respondent's back injury resulting from the 1986
accident was a significant factor only in connection with his
partial disability rating and that it was not the cause of his
permanent total disability.

The panel assigned a fifteen percent

(15%) permanent impairment rating for his back problem, five percent (5%) due to pre-existing conditions and ten percent (10%)
directly related to the industrial accident.
Report, at 7.)

(Medical Panel

The medical report concluded with the following

language:
It should mentioned that the Panel felt that
Respondent would never be able to return to the
work force in any capacity unless he has significant remission in his rheumatoid disease. With a
remission he would still not be able to do anything that required light labor.

-2-

Id. Rather than interpreting the above-quoted passage consistently with the rest of the evidence, the Commission, taking the
final statement out of context of the report, found that it
required an award based on permanent total disability.

To reach

its conclusion, the Commission gave the report the most unlikely
and unreasonable interpretation possible.

Thus, the Commission's

decision was arbitrary and capricious and its Order Granting
Applicant's Motion for Review should be reversed.
II.

THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT
RESPONDENT'S INJURY WAS CAUSED BY HIS EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITY.
Respondent argues in his brief that he meets the legal

standards

for permanent

and

total

disability,

and

that

the

reports of various doctors support an award of permanent total
impairment.

Petitioner, USX, does not contend that Respondent is

not impaired, but rather that his impairment is not due to his
employment at USX.

There is simply no evidence of any causal

connection between his work-related

activities and his total

disability.
At the time of the accident, Respondent was already
afflicted with arthritis and, as he points out in his Reply
Brief, approximately one month after his most recent industrial
accident, he was diagnosed as having "severe degenerative arthritis with total destruction of the right hip. . . "
Respondent at 13-14

(Brief of

(quoting Dr. Bromley's report at R.48.))

-3-

Although Respondent is correct in asserting that his
arthritis does not necessarily preclude an award of benefits,
Respondent may not recover benefits from USX for his arthritis.
He is entitled to recover benefits from USX only to the extent
his disability resulted from his employment.

In

Large

v.

Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988), the claimant suffered a 10% permanent disability attributable to a slip
and fall accident on the job.

Although the claimant was totally

disabled due to "age, obesity, lack of transferable skills and
prior back surgery," the court upheld a denial of permanent total
disability benefits because the claimant's total disability was
"the result of pre-existing conditions and not an industrial
accident."

Id. at 957.

A denial of benefits was upheld on the

same grounds in Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d
718, 721 (Utah 1986), where the court stated:

"While it is

unquestioned that the medical panel found [the claimant] to be
one hundred percent physically impaired, the panel also found
that

the total

impairment

arthritic problems."

was

due

to

the

onset

of

severe

See also Allen v. Industrial Commission,

729 P.2d 15,18 (Utah 1986) (there must be a sufficient causal
connection between the disability and the working conditions).
Although the respondent

is correct in stating that

two-thirds of his back problems are related to his 1986 industrial accident, it is clear from the record that his back problems are not the cause of his total disability.
-4-

The specific

finding of the medical panel in that regard is that Respondent is
fifteen

(15%) permanently partially disabled due to his back

injury at USX:

ten percent (10%) directly due to the back injury

and five percent (5%) due to "lighting up" of an earlier back
injury.

(Medical Panel Report at 7.)

The panel also specifi-

cally found that Respondent's back injury did not aggravate or
light up the arthritis.
Given the totality of the evidence, the ALJ correctly
concluded that "the applicant has not established] that his
present disability is due to the industrial accident."
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, at 4.)

(Findings

USX's liability,

if any, must be limited to benefits for the industrial injury.
If indeed Respondent is permanently totally disabled, compensation for that portion of his disability not arising from the
industrial accident must come from the Second Injury Fund.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69(1) (Supp. 1987) (as amended 1984)(when
permanent total incapacity results from a combination of disease
and industrial accident, "liability of the employer . . . shall
be for the industrial injury only.

The remainder shall be paid

out of the Second Injury Fund . . . " ) .

1

The Commission's award

The quoted language is from the 1984 version of §35-1-69(1)
which was repealed when the current version became effective on
July 1, 1988. Because this action arose before that date, it is
governed by the 1984 version of §35-1-69. See Carlucci v. Utah
State Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986) (law establishing
substantive rights and liabilities is statute in force when cause
of action arises).
-5-

of permanent total disability benefits should be reversed because
there is no evidence that Respondent's employment was causally
connected to his total disability.
III. THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S
ORDER
HAS
DEPRIVED USX OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
In his brief, Respondent asserts that because neither
party objected to admission of the Medical Panel Report, USX is
now precluded
process.

from claiming a violation of its right to due

As explained in Section I of this brief, however, the

unreasonable and arbitrary interpretation of the Medical Panel
Report by the Industrial Commission raised a question of fact
that was not present in the proceedings below.

USX, therefore,

had no opportunity for a meaningful hearing on the issue raised
solely by the commission.

If the Court allows the Industrial

Commission's interpretation of the report to stand, USX will have
been deprived of due process.
IV.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT COMPLY WITH
THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT.
Respondent correctly points out that Petitioner should

have

cited

section

63-46b-12

of

the

Utah

Code

rather

than

section 63-46b-10 for the proposition that the Commission must
base its decision on the record and give reasons therefor supported by facts from the record.

Respondent, however, in quoting

section 63-46b-12(6)(c) has omitted subsection (v) which states

-6-

that the Commission's order on review must contain the reasons
for the particular disposition of the case.
As explained in Section I of this brief and in the
Brief of Petitioner submitted to this Court on May 10, 1989, the
Commission relied on inferences that are not adequately supported
by the facts from the record.

It gave no reasons for reaching a

conclusion contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence and,
instead, simply stated that the last sentence of the report could
not be overlooked.
at 2.)

(Order Granting Applicants Motion for Review,

Because the Commission's order was without a reasonable

basis in the evidence, and because the Commission failed to give
reasons for its decision, the Order Granting Applicant's Motion
For Review must be overturned.
CONCLUSION
The

Industrial

Commission's

decision

in

granting

applicants motion for review was arbitrary and capricious because
it was based on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts of
record.

There is simply insufficient evidence to show that

Respondent's disability was caused by his employment activity.
In

addition,

the

ambiguous

interpretation

of

the

Medical Panel Report raised a question of fact not present in the
proceedings below.

Because the issue arose only after the report

had been adopted by the ALJ, USX has been deprived of its right
to due process.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Industrial Commission's
Order Granting Applicant's Motion for Review should be reversed.
At the very least, the case should be remanded for clarification
of the Medical Panel Report.
DATED this Q&. day of August, 1989.

4*I+,'*>1./^LyiES M. EEEGANTE

WILLIAM J. EVANS
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
CHRISTOPHER A. CONKLING
USX CORPORATION
Attorneys for Petitioner
USX Corporation
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Sherlynn W. Fenstermaker
42 North University Avenue
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Erie V. Boorman
Administrator, Second Injury Fund
P. 0. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (Supp. 1987) (as amended 1984):
If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes,
sustains an industrial injury for which either compensation or
medical care, or both, is provided by this chapter that results
in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than he
would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing
incapacity, compensation, medical care, and other related items
as outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of
the combined injuries, but the liability of the employer for such
compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be for
the industrial injury only.

The remainder shall be paid out of

the Second Injury Fund as provided for in Subsection 35-1-68(1),
and shall be determined after assigning the impairment for the
industrial injury on a whole person uncombined basis and then
deducting this percentage from the total combined rating.
combined impairment rating may not exceed 100%.

This

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(6)(c)(1988):
(6)(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or
requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii)

finding

of

facts

as

to

each

of

the

issues

law as to each

of

the

issues

reviewed;
(iv) conclusions

of

reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether
all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be
remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved
parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or
review.
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